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Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the 
Politics of Sexual Violence 
Eric S. Janus∗ 
Sexually violent predator (“SVP”) commitment laws offer a 
dangerous but seductive promise.  In exchange for perfect protection 
against a few of the most reviled and dangerous criminals—those who 
prey sexually on women and children—we need only remove from 
those individuals the protection of our most fundamental 
constitutional limitations on government power.  We reassure 
ourselves that our molestation of these constitutional protections is 
safely limited.  Unfortunately, we are finding that the seduction of 
public protection is too strong a force.  SVP laws entail a logic that 
pushes our thinking and approach to sexual violence ever further off 
balance and demands increasing investment in their strategies.  Like 
Pandora’s box, these new laws, which seemed attractive at first, now 
seem excessive, but cannot, given the political context in which they 
exist, be abandoned or limited. 
SVP laws make an extraordinary moral and constitutional claim: 
We permit our government—despite its democratic values—to pick 
out a small group of people and treat them in a way that we would 
never allow ourselves to be treated.  We allow this group—and only 
this group—to be locked up to prevent unspecified crimes that they 
might (or might not) commit at some unspecified time in the future.  
These laws violate a fundamental premise of our constitutional 
system: As a general matter, the State can take away a person’s 
physical liberty only if he or she is charged with a specific crime, and 
convicted of that crime according to a set of strict procedural 
protections.  As Justice Jackson stated in Williamson v. United States,1 
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“Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but 
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so 
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort 
to it.” 
How did it come to pass that sixteen states,2 in adopting SVP 
laws, have been willing to compromise the “great safeguards which 
the law adopts [to protect individuals] in the punishment of crime 
and the upholding of justice”?3  The story begins in the late 1980s.  
Heinous crimes, committed by sex offenders just released from 
prison, created a political environment that demanded action.  
Despite their toxicity to the protection of liberty, SVP laws proved too 
hard to resist.  Policymakers chose these laws precisely because they 
allowed a fundamental bypass of constitutional protections.  A 
Minnesota task force, for example, recommended the use of SVP laws 
to circumvent three procedural safeguards inherent in the criminal 
justice system.4  First, the criminal justice system requires in-court 
testimony to prove a crime, whereas SVP commitments make liberal 
use of hearsay evidence embedded in the expert testimony.  Thus, 
the task force surmised, SVP laws can protect society against 
“individuals . . . who may not have been convicted of a sex offense, 
because of the reluctance of young and/or scared victims to testify 
against perpetrators of sexual abuse.”5  Second, SVP laws circumvent 
the limits imposed by strict burdens of proof by allowing the 
confinement of individuals who “may be dangerous but evade 
 
 2 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (2003) (effective July 1, 1996); CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (effective Oct. 11, 
1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910–.931 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 1, 
1999); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1–/99 (2002 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 1, 1998); 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (West Supp. 2004) (effective May 6, 1998); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (Supp. 2003) (effective July 1, 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 14, 1994); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.01–.23 (West 2002) (effective May 22, 1997); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
632.480–.513 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (effective Jan. 1, 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
30:4-27.24 to .38 (West Supp. 2004) (effective Aug. 12, 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 
25-03.1-01 to -46 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (effective Apr. 8, 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-
48-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op. 2002 & Supp. 2003) (effective June 5, 1998); TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.147 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (effective Sept. 1, 1999); 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1 to .19 (Michie Supp. 2003) (effective Jan. 1, 2003); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.902 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (effective July 1, 1990); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.13 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (effective June 2, 1994). 
 3 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996) (quoting United States v. 
Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906)). 
 4 Psychopathic Personalities Subcommittee, Report, in MINNESOTA DEPT. OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER: COMMITMENT ACT TASK FORCE 45, 48-
50 (1988). 
 5 Id. at 45. 
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conviction due to the high burden of proof required in criminal 
cases.”6  Third, because SVP laws are not limited by double jeopardy 
and ex post facto protections, they can compensate for the 
“comparatively short correctional sentences” for sex offenders by 
confining individuals after they have completed their criminal 
sentences.7 
The original SVP laws, passed in the early 1990s, were 
immediately challenged in court.  Although the attacks took several 
legal forms, at bottom they all argued that SVP laws violated the 
fundamental compact limiting the state’s power to deprive us of our 
liberty.8  The constitutional issues badly divided the courts that 
considered them.  In the end, by a five-to-four vote, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the use of SVP laws.9  But the courts’ 
imprimatur has been conditional.  Recognizing that SVP laws create 
an escape from the strict limits of the criminal law, the courts have 
held that SVP laws must be reserved for the “extraordinary”; they 
must be severely limited.10  The central imperative for civil 
commitment is that it must remain secondary to the criminal justice 
system as a tool for social control.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court 
stated, “[S]ubstantive due process forecloses the substitution of 
preventive detention schemes for the criminal justice system, and the 
judiciary has a constitutional duty to intervene before civil 
commitment becomes the norm and criminal prosecution the 
exception.”11 
Thus, the effort to justify SVP commitment laws centered on 
 
 6 Id. at 48. 
 7 Id. at 49. 
 8 See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.) (considering assertions that 
laws violate due process and equal protection), cert. denied, Blodgett v. Minnesota, 
513 U.S. 849 (1994); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (rejecting challenge 
based on ex post facto and double jeopardy violations). 
 9 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 10 See In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 1996) (Gardebring, J., 
dissenting) (describing SVP commitment as “the extraordinary sanction of indefinite 
commitment without periodic judicial review”). 
 11 In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 183 (Minn. 1996).  The Hendricks Court 
acknowledges this principle as well, suggesting that at least part of the role of mental 
disorder is to provide a constitutionally adequate boundary around the use of civil 
confinement to accomplish social control goals: 
This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of 
future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other 
dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with 
exclusively through criminal proceedings.  Hendricks’ diagnosis as a 
pedophile, which qualifies as a “mental abnormality” under the Act, 
thus plainly suffices for due process purposes. 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997). 
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courts giving assurances that the “reduced-protection” zone was 
exceptional because it applied only to a small group of people.  More 
importantly, through these assurances, proponents of SVP 
commitment laws sought to show that the unfortunate group whose 
rights were to be curtailed was not just small numerically, but also 
somehow different in kind from the rest of us.  In this way, we could 
all rest assured that what we are doing to “them” could not, in the 
future, be done to “us.” 
States and courts made three promises in an effort to reassure 
themselves and the rest of us that SVP laws would be extremely 
limited in their application.  First, they promised that confinement 
would be numerically small because the laws would be directed only 
at the “most dangerous.”12  Second, they promised that the targets 
would different in kind from the rest of us because only the “mentally 
disordered” would be locked up.13  Third, they promised that 
confinement would be limited because treatment would be provided 
and that “patients” would be released from confinement as soon as 
they were no longer dangerous or mentally disordered.14 
Although these assurances were motivated in the first instance by 
constitutional concerns, there is a second, more utilitarian reason for 
the promise of limitations: SVP programs are very expensive, so 
policymakers promised that the programs would not continue to 
grow in size and expense, and that the extraordinary cost of an SVP 
commitment would be reserved for cases in which the danger to the 
community was extraordinarily high.  A basic principle of 
criminology—the principle of “selective incapacitation”15—as well as 
common sense, support this utilitarian principle by which the 
intensity of intervention is proportional to the risk posed by the 
individual.16 
Over the years I have argued, in law review articles and court 
briefs, that these promises were empty window dressing.  First, the 
 
 12 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364 (1997) (reasoning that SVP laws “tak[e] 
great care to confine only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals”). 
 13 Id. at 358 (“We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have 
coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’”). 
 14 See, e.g., Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995) (noting 
requirement for provision of treatment and for release when “if no reasonable 
relation exists between the original reason for commitment and the continued 
confinement”). 
 15 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 34-36, 143-44, 169-71 (1995). 
 16 Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-
Based Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1116 (2003). 
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“most dangerous” claim is dubious because of the limitations in our 
ability to predict dangerousness.  The claim has been further 
undercut by court decisions that systematically fail to set high, 
consistent, and accountable standards for risk assessment.17  Second, 
the “mental disorder” limitation is untenable because it is so vague 
and broad that it excludes almost no one.18  Finally, the promise of 
treatment and time-limited confinement is belied by the almost non-
existent treatment graduation rates in SVP programs across the 
country.19 
THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
My purpose in this Article is not to rehearse the systematic 
betrayal of these constitutional promises.  Rather, I report on an 
equally serious problem.  Even when state officials have taken the 
limitations on SVP commitments seriously, their efforts, when 
“exposed” by the media, have been truncated by a firestorm of 
popular and political obstruction. 
I summarize here the recent events in Minnesota and Wisconsin, 
two of the original SVP states.  Their programs are now a decade or 
more old.  The central lesson of these stories is that the politics of 
sexual violence, as framed by SVP laws and popular passion, will not 
let us close this Pandora’s box.  Ultimately, it will be both society at 
large and future victims of sexual violence who suffer, because the 
expense of SVP programs is wildly out of proportion to their benefit.  
As more and more resources pour into SVP programs, the distortion 
in policy and resource allocation will become more and more 
severe.20  Society will suffer because of the resource drain, and victims 
will suffer because these SVP programs will draw more and more 
resources away from programs that address the great bulk of sexual 
violence in the community. 
I draw these conclusions by examining recent events in 
 
 17 See Janus, supra note 16, at 1110-11; Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the 
Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 33 (1997); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, The Forensic 
Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and 
Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443 (2003). 
 18 See Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1279 (1998); Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the Official 
Narrative and Revealing the Rules in Use, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 71 (1997). 
 19 See W. Lawrence Fitch, Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States: Legislative 
and Policy Concerns, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 489, 492-93 (2003); Eric S. Janus & 
Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually 
Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 323 (2003). 
 20 See Janus, supra note 16, at 1101-09. 
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Minnesota and Wisconsin.  As noted, these are two of the original 
SVP states, and their programs are among the most mature in the 
nation.  The events are echoed, however, in other mature programs, 
such as Washington’s, and are beginning to beset California’s newer 
program.  We can safely assume that the same experience will befall 
other SVP programs as they mature, as well. 
Minnesota 
The Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”) was designed 
by Dr. Michael Farnsworth, the director of forensic psychiatry for the 
state.  The program’s design was based on Farnsworth’s research into 
the state of the art of sex offender treatment nationwide.  It was 
designed as a step-level program, and, in my opinion, Dr. Farnsworth 
truly believed that many of the men committed could work their ways 
through the program and “graduate” in a matter of two to four 
years.21 
There were indications that Minnesota took its constitutional 
and programmatic mandates seriously.  For example, the per diem 
expense for the Minnesota program has been among the highest in 
the nation,22 and the Minnesota treatment program is cited as the 
national model.23  While other states housed their SVP programs in 
correctional settings,24 or used old jail buildings (New Jersey, for 
example), Minnesota built a new facility, disconnected from any 
prison, to house its SVP program.25  Finally, the State funded the 
development of an actuarial tool to assess the risk of recidivism.26 
 
 21 See Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995).  In Call, a 1995 Minnesota 
Supreme Court case, the court relied on representations of state officials stating that 
an “average patient” was expected to complete the “intensive” treatment program in 
a “minimum of 24 months.”  Id. at 319 n.5.  Later, treatment officials described the 
length of treatment as at least four years.  E-mail from Anita Schlank, Ph.D., then-
Clinical Director of Minnesota Sex Offender Program, to Eric S. Janus (Aug. 19, 
2002) [hereinafter E-mail from Schlank] (noting that most patients are unable to 
complete the program in the minimum period) (on file with author). 
 22 Fitch, supra note 19, at 493. 
 23 See Anita Schlank et al., The Minnesota Sex Offender Program, in THE SEXUAL 
PREDATOR: LAW, POLICY, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 10-14 (Anita Schlank & Fred 
Cohen eds., 1999) (describing the Minnesota program and noting its national 
prominence). 
 24 Roxanne Lieb, State Policy Perspective on Sexual Predator Laws, in PROTECTING 
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 46-51 tbl. 
2.2 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds., 2003). 
 25 Conrad deFiebre, Psychopathic Sex Offenders Get New Home, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIB., Nov. 5, 1995, at 1B. 
 26 MINN. STAT. § 244.052(2) (1996); Douglas L. Epperson et al., Minnesota Sex 
Offender Screening Tool—Revised (MnSOST-R): Development, Validation, and Recommended 
Risk Level Cut Scores (Dec. 2003), at 
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Of course, there were many ways in which the assurances about 
the law were belied.  The most significant of these, the promise of 
progress through the treatment program, simply did not materialize.  
Thus, the population of the MSOP kept growing as new 
commitments continued apace, no patients were released, and only a 
small handful of detainees managed to achieve, and maintain, the 
highest levels of treatment at which some form of release might be 
contemplated.27 
By 1998, the failed promise of the treatment program began to 
be noticed.  In a report to the Legislature in 1998, the Minnesota 
Department of Corrections projected a rapid growth in the 
population under commitment, and a concomitant growth in the 
costs of the SVP program.28 
Concern about the growing costs led to several changes in the 
MSOP.  For example, the State developed a satellite replica of the 
program in a prison.  This program was aimed at imprisoned sex 
offenders in an effort to reduce the number of released sex offenders 
who required civil commitment.29  Officials also began to examine 
why the treatment program had almost non-existent treatment 
completion and discharge rates.  Officials focused on the fact that 
committed individuals were not equally competent in navigating the 
rather complex “cognitive behavioral” treatment program and that 
committed individuals varied widely in the level and nature of the risk 
that they posed.30  For example, then-clinical director, Dr. Anita 
Schlank, reported at a symposium held in November 2002 that about 
twenty-five percent of the committed men could be managed, with 
 
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/epperson/TechUpdatePaper12-03.pdf 
(last visited June 15, 2004). 
 27 Janus, supra note 16, at 1090. 
 28 See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., CIVIL COMMITMENT STUDY GROUP, REPORT TO 
LEGISLATURE 21 (1998), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/ 
socpublications.htm (last visited June 15, 2004). 
 29 Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Justice Breyer stated that the Kansas SVP Act: 
did not provide Hendricks (or others like him) with any treatment 
until after his release date from prison and only inadequate treatment 
thereafter.  These, and certain other, special features of the Act 
convince me that it was not simply an effort to commit Hendricks 
civilly, but rather an effort to inflict further punishment upon him. 
Id.; cf. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., PROGRAMS FOR SEX OFFENDERS, available at 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/pdf/Sex%20Offender%20Programs.pdf 
(last visited June 15, 2004). 
 30 See Eric S. Janus & Nancy Walbek, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota: A 
Descriptive Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 343 (2000). 
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proper supervision, in the community.31  The Fiscal Year 2003 
Operational Plan for the Minnesota Department of Human Services 
(“DHS”) proposed an “alternate treatment track for individuals who 
chronically refuse to participate in sex offender program[s].”32  
Officials also proposed the development of “appropriate clinical 
pathways based on client characteristics, rather than commitment 
status,” a project that will involve identifying “patients whose 
treatment needs are not currently being adequately met (as indicated 
via lack of progress toward less restrictive settings).”33 
All of this planning came to an apparent halt in June 2003, 
however, with the publication of an article in the Twin Cities’ Star 
Tribune newspaper entitled, State Looks to Release Sexual Psychopaths; Is 
Concern for Offenders, or the Lock-Up Program’s High Cost, Driving 
Change?34  Referring to the aforementioned planning, the article 
characterized officials as “looking for ways to release into the 
community some of the 190 sexual psychopaths . . . .  These repeat 
rapists and pedophiles . . . have been declared sexually dangerous by 
judges . . . .”35  According to the article, the officials who run the 
program felt that they had fulfilled only part of their legal 
obligation—to protect the public—and had neglected the other 
part—”giving sexual psychopaths in their care individualized 
treatment in the least prison-like settings possible.”36  The article 
stated that “sex psychopaths” would be released under strict 
supervision and that officials can “manage—but not eliminate—risk 
to the community.”37  The article also suggested that intense 
supervision could achieve a recidivism rate of ten percent.  It painted 
 
 31 E-mail from Schlank, supra note 21: 
[W]e estimated that there were approximately 48 individuals who were 
likely not an escape risk and if, at the time of their commitment, there 
had been a residential treatment program that accepted Level Three 
sex offenders and could ensure that they were observed around-the-
clock and prevented from any access to potential victims, it seemed 
possible that they could have been placed there with a “stayed 
commitment” hanging over their head in case they did not succeed. 
However, Dr. Schlank qualified her statement by acknowledging that “in no way do I 
consider myself an expert on assessing escape risk.”  Id. 
 32 STATE OPERATED FORENSIC SERVICES, OPERATIONAL PLAN B, FISCAL YEAR 2003 
(2003) (appearing as the first item under heading “Product & Related Tasks”). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Josephine Marcotty, State Looks to Release Sexual Psychopaths; Is Concern for 
Offenders, or the Lock-Up Program’s High Cost, Driving Change?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., 
June 22, 2003, at 1A. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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the officials as discounting this risk to the community in order to 
satisfy the rights of the sex offenders: “More important [than the risk 
to the community], they say, the state has a legal obligation to 
provide effective treatment.”38 
The article quoted the Democratic Attorney General, who 
characterized the plan as being a consequence of the Republican 
Governor’s “no new taxes pledge”: “‘This whole no-new-tax pledge is 
having an unyielding consequence to the public,’ said Attorney 
General Mike Hatch, whose office petitions to have sexually 
dangerous offenders committed for many counties.  ‘To keep a few 
bucks in people’s pockets, we are going to let sexual predators out to 
harm people.’”39  A prominent prosecutor was quoted as mocking the 
claim that offenders released to the community would be adequately 
supervised.  Referring to the projected ten percent recidivism rate for 
released offenders, the article stated, “Some prosecutors don’t see 
one-in-10 recidivism rate as a success story, especially since no one 
can predict which sex offender will rape again.”40 
The story remained in the headlines for several weeks, while the 
Attorney General and the Governor attacked each other and traded 
ascriptions of blame.41  Finally, the Governor issued an Executive 
Order that directed the DHS officials not to release anyone unless 
“required by law or ordered by a court.”42  The media reported that 
the Governor’s Chief of Staff explained the meaning and intent of 
the Executive Order in this way: “The governor doesn’t want these 
guys to get out, and he’s made that clear ever since he was running 
for office.”43 
The Minnesota SVP crisis entered a second stage in November 
2003 with the tragic disappearance of college student Drew Sjodin in 
East Grand Forks, North Dakota, just west of the border with 
Minnesota.  Soon after her disappearance, Alfonso Rodriguez was 
arrested and charged with her kidnapping.  Rodriguez had been 
released from a Minnesota prison some seven months before and was 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Marcotty, supra note 34. 
 41 See, e.g., Mark Brunswick, Pawlenty Criticizes Hatch, Article; Governor Says Debate 
over Star Tribune’s Sex-Offender Story Is Being Pushed by Politics, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., 
June 24, 2003, at 1B; Lori Sturdevant, Editorial, Versus Hatch, Pawlenty Prevailed, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 29, 2003, at 9AA. 
 42 Exec. Order No. 03-10, 28 Minn. Reg. 57 (July 21, 2003). 
 43 Warren Wolfe, Sex Offender Release Rules Are Changed; Pawlenty’s Executive Order, 
in Effect, Will Keep Pyschopaths Locked Up, Chief of Staff Says, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., 
July 11, 2003, at 1B (quoting Chief of Staff Charlie Weaver). 
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classified as a “Level 3” sex offender,44 a label reserved for offenders 
with a “high risk” to reoffend.45 
In many ways, the incident was an archetypal case and 
immediately entered the national spotlight.  Sjodin was a young, 
blond college student, abducted and (many assumed) raped and 
possibly murdered by a stranger—an older male, repeat sex offender 
(who is a Mexican-American, perhaps making the archetypal salience 
of the alleged crime even stronger).  One newspaper article, assessing 
why the Sjodin case caught the nation’s attention, surmised, “part of 
the answer may be in Dru Sjodin’s smile: Beauty to the Beast some 
people see in Rodriguez, released from captivity in May after serving 
23 years for vicious attacks on women.”46 
The case reignited the political finger pointing between the 
Governor and the Attorney General.  The debate was now 
transformed, moving as if scripted, to the next dramatic level.  In 
place of the hypothetical future release from commitment of 
moderate-risk offenders, the new story focused on a real victim and a 
real offender and a real crime. 
The story line immediately focused on why and how this “level 3 
sex offender” was not civilly committed.  The Attorney General 
accused the Governor of allowing this individual to be released; the 
Governor and his Commissioner of Corrections blamed their 
subordinates for “bad judgment” and promised to seek disciplinary 
action and “removal” of the state workers responsible for 
recommending against commitment.47  The Governor proposed 
reinstating the death penalty in Minnesota, a state which had 
abolished the ultimate penalty some one hundred years earlier.48 
The crisis focused attention on the process by which offenders 
are selected for commitment.  As if it were reporting a scoop, a Star 
Tribune headline disclosed, Hurdles High for Offender Commitment; Many 
Most Likely to Commit Sex Crimes Again Are Released After Prison Rather 
Than Institutionalized.49  The body of the article gave the details: “Since 
 
 44 Chuck Haga, Suspect Held in Abduction; Sex Offender Charged in Dru Sjodin Case, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 2, 2003, at 1A. 
 45 MINN. STAT. § 244.052 3(e) (1996) (defining a level III sex offender as “an 
offender whose risk assessment score indicates a high risk of reoffense”). 
 46 Chuck Haga, High Publicity of Sjodin Case Puzzles Some; Why Has This 
Abduction Had Such Lasting Attention?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 7, 2003, at 1A. 
 47 Patricia Lopez, Governor Cites Bad Judgment on Rodriguez; Pawlenty Faulted 
Corrections Staffers in Release of Convict, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 19, 2003, at 1A. 
 48 Conrad deFiebre, Death Penalty Vote Is Urged; Gov. Pawlenty Called for a 
Constitutional Referendum on the Issue, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 28, 2004, at 1B. 
 49 Josephine Marcotty & John Stefany, Hurdles High for Offender Commitment; Many 
Most Likely to Commit Sex Crimes Again Are Released after Prison Rather Than 
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1999, three-fourths of the rapists and pedophiles most likely to 
reoffend were released in Minnesota instead of being committed for 
indefinite treatment at a secure psychiatric facility.”50  The article 
continued: 
The data show that commitment of offenders like Rodriguez is 
not driven only by how dangerous they are.  It is also governed by 
the very high standards set by state law and the courts.  And all 
along the way, the individual judgments of psychologists, 
prosecutors and judges can influence the outcome, making it 
appear almost arbitrary.51 
The article reported that “controversy is becoming focused on the 
validity of how corrections and justice officials choose who should be 
committed and why.”52  The newspaper noted that some offenders 
who had been assessed in the actuarial risk assessment as in the 
highest risk group had not been committed, while others assessed as 
a more moderate risk were committed.53 
An editorial in the Star Tribune shaped and reflected the nature 
of the debate.54  The questions, according to the editorial, were 
whether the system is “too lax,” and how could an offender “officially 
classified by the state as a sexual predator” not be referred for civil 
commitment?55  Claiming that releasing a person like Rodriguez 
seems “wildly risky,” the editorial then posed a question to which 
Minnesotans deserve “a better explanation”: “Did they make a serious 
error, or did they take a gamble—hoping to save the cash a 
commitment would consume?”56 
Eventually, the Governor and Commissioner of Corrections 
settled on a strategy of referring all “Level 3” sex offenders to county 
prosecutors for consideration of civil commitment.  The Corrections 
Commissioner explained, “she ordered the change to ensure that 
prosecutors familiar with the laws review all Level 3 offenders for 
possible civil commitments.  Now only corrections officials do the 
initial reviews and referrals.”57  This plan amounted to a shifting of 
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the responsibility (and, hence, blame) for making judgments about 
sex offender commitments from a centralized process of the 
Department of Corrections to eighty-seven county attorneys.58  The 
Commissioner of Corrections “defended that response as necessary to 
ensure ‘that we don’t miss somebody who should be committed.’”59 
The deliberations then shifted to the legislature with over fifty 
bills introduced to address the problem.60  In the midst of this 
legislative frenzy, the Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party began running “a 
caustic television commercial” accusing the Republican Governor of 
“bungling the release of sexual predators.”61  The Star Tribune 
described the ad in a front page story: “Over foreboding music, the 
camera narrows in on [Governor] Pawlenty’s eyes and a narrator says: 
‘These eyes just watched as administrative bungling and the wrong 
budget priorities let rapists and sexual predators back on our 
streets.’”62 
Wisconsin 
The developments in Wisconsin, a Midwestern state similar in 
many ways to Minnesota, offer an instructive comparative case study.  
Wisconsin’s SVP program was, like Minnesota’s, one of the original 
three modern SVP laws.  Both programs grew consistently but 
moderately over the initial years of their operation, with Wisconsin’s 
reaching a population of 260 in the fall of 2003,63 compared with two 
hundred in Minnesota.64  Wisconsin’s program differed from 
Minnesota’s in two notable respects.  First, the Wisconsin and 
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Minnesota courts diverged in their interpretations of their respective 
discharge standards.  In Wisconsin, the courts had held that an 
individual must be released if his risk of reoffense fell below the 
threshold for commitment, substantial probability of reoffense.65  The 
Minnesota courts, in contrast, had held that discharge would be 
permitted only if the individual could make an acceptable adjustment 
to society, a standard that suggests a lower level of risk than the 
“highly likely” standard required for commitment in Minnesota.66 
The second difference is likely more significant.  Prior to 2000, 
Wisconsin, like Minnesota, had a policy limiting supervised releases 
to individuals who had completed the prescribed treatment program.  
In 2000, Wisconsin treatment officials liberalized the criteria 
employed by state evaluators to include individuals whose risk could 
be “managed safely” in the community.  According to news accounts, 
this change caused the rate of recommendations for supervised 
release to double.67  By the fall of 2003, the number of persons who 
had been released, either conditionally or absolutely, from 
Wisconsin’s program reached about thirty-nine.68  Of that number, a 
fair proportion had been returned to the institution because of “rule 
violations,” but the news media reported no instances of sexual 
reoffenses by released individuals.69 
As described above, Minnesota officials were working on a 
similar change in policy in the summer of 2003 when the press 
reported the plans, triggering the first chapter of the political 
firestorm and effectively putting stop to those plans.  In September of 
the same year, some three months later, the press in Wisconsin 
discovered and exposed Wisconsin’s liberal standards for release.  A 
front-page headline in Milwaukee’s Journal Sentinel blared, State Tops 
in Release of Sexual Predators.70 
The news report triggered immediate legislative proposals to 
tighten release standards.  Within two days, the sponsors of the 
original SVP law proposed lowering the standard for commitment 
from “substantially probable” to “probable” to reoffend, thereby 
changing the standard for discharge as well.71  The proposal also 
required “progress in treatment” as a condition for supervised 
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release.72  A follow-up Journal Sentinal article quoted the director of 
the secure facility as pointing out that the existing discharge 
standards would allow community placements of individuals whose 
risk of reoffense was below seventy-five percent but that “[i]t’s not a 
determination that the person is safe.”73  Thus, one of the sponsors of 
the legislation stated, “The standard needs to fall to the side of 
protecting of public safety.”74 
In a subsequent article, the Journal Sentinel described the state’s 
policy as “a practice quietly implemented within the state 
[Department of Health and Family Services]” and characterized it as 
having “turned the law upside down.”75  This sentiment was echoed in 
an editorial in the Appleton Post-Crescent, which weighed in to support 
the tightening of standards.  The paper opined that the “idea” of the 
SVP law was to “minimize” the risk to the community, and criticized 
the legal standard for release: 
An offender has to be deemed “substantially probable” to re-
offend to be denied release.  That means an offender who is only 
“probable” or, say, “slightly probable” would have to be released.  
Someone who is “probable” to commit another sexual offense can 
rejoin the community, with supervision?  No way.  No wonder 
communities are rejecting these guys.76 
Meanwhile, the state’s efforts to find community placements for 
committed offenders were meeting another obstacle, as citizens 
voiced “virulent opposition” to proposals to house offenders in their 
neighborhoods.77  In September 2003, the press reported that the 
third proposed location for convicted child molester Billy Lee 
Morford—a home on a dead-end street in a mostly industrial area—
was scuttled when “a homeowner bowed to public pressure and 
withdrew an offer to rent.”78  The president of the local Apartment 
Association was quoted as saying that he “would advise against anyone 
renting to Morford. . . . ‘Nobody wants to touch this,’ [he] said.  ‘You 
don’t want to have your neighbors protesting and marching in front 
of your house.  You can’t blame people for not renting to him.’”79 
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The case of pedophile Shawn Schulpius was even more extreme.  
A judge had ordered him released to a community placement facility 
in 1997, but the state claimed to be unable to locate a placement that 
would accept him.  In 2004, Schulpius sought a remedy from the state 
court of appeals, but the court rejected his claim, holding, in a split 
decision, that “the state acted in good faith in attempting to find 
placement for Schulpius and that its failure to do so did not rise to 
the level of a violation of his due process rights.”80 
LESSONS ABOUT THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
The lessons from Minnesota and Wisconsin are straightforward.  
Efforts to hew to the limiting-assurances for SVP laws will be 
politically unacceptable, even when they are abstract and 
hypothetical and have not had any demonstrable negative effect on 
public safety.  When a real tragedy occurs, the media and politicians 
will interpret the tragedy as a failure to use the SVP tool broadly 
enough.  Moves will be made to broaden the SVP net.  Rare but 
archetypal crimes—the “Beauty and the Beast” paradigm—will form 
the template against which solutions to the problem of sexual 
violence are measured.  Lost in the fog will be the great bulk of 
sexual abuse that does not fit this mold. 
The stories illustrate the immense political energy inherent in 
these archetypal stories of sexual violence.  In Wisconsin, “virulent 
opposition” has thwarted the law’s command that graduates from the 
SVP program be placed in the community.  The courts of Wisconsin 
have apparently bowed to the public will on this issue.81  A similar 
story is being spun out in California, where the first several graduates 
of that state’s SVP program are seeking community housing.  
Reported one paper, “Brian DeVries, the first graduate of a special 
state treatment program for violent sexual predators, ended up in a 
trailer at the Correctional Training Facility on a judge’s order after 
more than 100 Santa Clara County landlords refused to rent to 
him.”82 
As California’s story unfolds, state officials are expressing 
concern about this public reaction: 
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The uproar that has accompanied the release of [the first 
graduates for the program] has prompted the administration of 
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and legislators to reexamine the 
eight-year old [SVP] program.  “We are concerned about the 
difficulties and the growing attention to the placement of these 
individuals,” said . . . [the] spokeswoman for the Health and 
Human Services Agency.83 
A newspaper headline highlighted the official concern: State Law 
Threatened by Public’s Revulsion to Sex Offenders/Legal Challenge Could 
Result if Predators Are Given Nowhere to Live.84 
But the experiences of Minnesota and Wisconsin suggest that 
the intensity of the public opposition to the release of committed sex 
offenders will be too intense for politicians to handle in a deliberate 
way.  No politician can afford to have any weakness on the issue 
exposed.  The politicization of the issue severely narrows the 
permissible areas of discourse.  The developments in Minnesota 
suggest that budget concerns are toxic, effectively making any kind of 
cost-benefit analysis untouchable.  Similarly, the consistent framing of 
the issue as reflecting a tension between patient rights and public 
safety leaves out any consideration of the principles of selective 
incapacitation and the notions of proportionality that it entails. 
The political vocabulary introduces the rhetoric of zero-
tolerance.  Thus, a newspaper editorial in Wisconsin ridicules a legal 
standard permitting supervised discharges of individuals who fall 
below the “substantially probable” standard for original 
commitment,85 and a Minnesota prosecutor calls a ten percent 
recidivism rate “unacceptable.”86  This is a significant transformation 
from the starting position in which the central justification for sex 
offender commitments was the legislature’s focus on the few “most 
dangerous” offenders. 
The political rhetoric tends to shape the problem of sexual 
violence in the form of the archetypal “Beauty and the Beast” story, 
focusing intense attention on rare but vivid crimes.  Such a narrow 
framing of the problem renders the huge proportion of sexual 
violence relatively invisible.  A media commentator in California 
highlighted the irony in the enormous public outcry over the 
supervised release for three SVP graduates: 
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It’s worth asking whether such strident resistance is proportional 
to the potential threat these ex-convicts pose. Not that the public 
shouldn’t be concerned about the ex-offenders’ potential to strike 
again. But citizens are overlooking thousands of other released 
sex offenders, many of whom are back on the street without any 
legal strings.  Care to guess how many convicted sex offenders are 
believed living freely in California, either paroled or simply 
released without significant treatment? It’s about 67,000 . . . .87 
If “Beauty and the Beast” is the template for the problem, then 
SVP commitments become the die for the solution.  In Minnesota, 
the release of Rodriguez was consistently described as a “mistake” that 
needed fixing.  We must, the papers said, “devise better ways to 
actually protect the community from sexual predators.”88  Discussion 
focused on SVP commitments as the (only) potential solution.  The 
direct question posed by the media was why civil commitment was not 
pursued for Rodriguez.  Civil commitment was identified as the 
“program designed to secure public safety,”89 as if this were the only 
means of protecting public safety.  Thus, civil commitment becomes 
the ordinary, rather than the extraordinary, solution. 
Unsurprisingly, the key fix for the “mistake” in Minnesota is to 
expand the reach of the SVP program.  The process by which this 
expansion was accomplished is instructive.  Prior to the crises, 
Minnesota essentially had four categories of risk for released sex 
offenders.  Three categories related to community notification, 
ranging from Level 1 (least risky) to Level 3 (most risky).  
Superimposed on that classification scheme was the somewhat 
separate civil commitment referral process.90  In general, only a 
fraction of the Level 3 offenders were referred for commitment.  The 
media response put immense pressure on this system.  The theme in 
the press after Rodriguez’s arrest was “why was this Level 3 offender 
not referred for commitment?”  The question has powerful 
resonance because the state defined Level 3 as the “highest” risk.  It 
was impossible for officials to justify why anyone with this designation 
would not be committed.  The natural response was to expand 
commitment referrals to the entire group of Level 3 offenders.  But 
there is no reason to think that the arbitrary boundary defining the 
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bottom of Level 3 will be the last resting point for civil commitment. 
When it comes to the politics of sexual violence, shifting blame 
is not only acceptable, but necessary.  No one wants to be the last one 
to have touched the “mistake.”  This blame shifting is not only 
unseemly, but it also will seriously undercut good public policy.  In 
the Minnesota story, shifting the blame has meant that the referral 
decisions about SVP commitments will be made by eighty-seven 
county prosecutors, rather than by a centralized and specialized 
team.91  This decentralization will decrease the chances that a 
consistent and evidence-based judgment about who is the “most 
dangerous” will be made. 
CONCLUSION 
The experiences in Minnesota and Wisconsin—echoed in 
California and Washington—send an unmistakable message.  Once a 
state has opened Pandora’s box by adopting an SVP Program, efforts 
to limit the growth of such programs will be met with fierce public 
opposition. 
We might ask why it matters.  After all, every predator confined 
is a predator from whom we are protected.  But it is much more 
complicated than that.  Every dollar spent on SVP programs is a 
dollar that could be spent on the much more ubiquitous, but 
relatively invisible, forms of violence against women and children.  As 
Minnesota politicians exchanged blame and legislators fell over each 
other to draft tougher laws for sex offenders, a small group of women 
and men protested state funding cuts of $5 million in domestic 
violence funding.92  The story, buried in the B-section of the 
newspaper, was a whisper compared to the cacophony generated by 
the crises of the previous summer.  Yet last year in Hennepin County 
(Minneapolis), Minnesota, there were “over 30,000 calls to 911 
regarding domestic violence. . . .  In the last five years 132 women and 
68 children under the age of 13 died because of domestic violence.”93 
The funding and focus on SVP commitments misdirect our focus 
and resources away from the “most danger.”  By using the Beauty and 
the Beast template as our guide in fixing the system, will we have 
accomplished a real increase in safety or simply achieved some 
reassurance, unsupported by any systemic change, that we have exiled 
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from our midst the symbolic “beast”? 
There is no shortage of responsible officials and commentators 
who understand that the Constitution and sound public policy 
demand that SVP programs be limited.  For example, Dean Steven 
McAllister, who spoke at the symposium at which this paper was 
presented, is no foe of SVP laws: he helped write the briefs defending 
the Kansas SVP law in the United States Supreme Court.  Yet Dean 
McAllister expressed his disappointment and concern at the failure 
to limit the actual implementation of these laws.94  Similarly, officials 
in Maryland, Washington, and California appeared to concur with 
the judgments of their counterparts in Minnesota and Wisconsin.  
Larry Fitch, head of Forensic Services for the Maryland Department 
of Health and Mental Hygiene, opined that the Wisconsin SVP 
program “is doing the best job of moving people through.”  He 
continued: “That is what this is supposed to be about—people are 
supposed to be treated and integrated back into the community.  In 
some states, people have bought into the idea that this is simply 
extended confinement.”95 
George Bukowski, who runs California’s program, similarly 
commented positively about the Wisconsin program: “Maybe we need 
to talk to people in Wisconsin,” he said.96  And Mark Seling, head of 
the Washington State SVP program, stated: “I think the problem with 
the laws has been that the view at the time they were conceived didn’t 
account for the whole picture, the mission of treatment and the 
process of release. . . .  That’s really where the problems lie.  We are 
all trying to learn.”97 
The lesson to be learned is an expensive one.  When Wisconsin’s 
SVP law was passed, “officials estimated that 10 people per year would 
be committed and that annual operating costs would be around $3.6 
million.”98  Some ten years later, in 2003, operating costs for the 
Wisconsin program are $26 million a year, and the physical facility 
itself cost about $40 million.99  California is slated to spend $350 
million for a facility to house its SVP population.100  Costs for the 
Minnesota program were projected to rise from $17 million to $76.9 
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million in the twelve years from 1998 to 2010.101 
The Wisconsin and Minnesota experiences show that even good 
intentions on the part of state officials will be insufficient to hold 
these programs to the strict limits they require.  Once the politics of 
sexual violence attaches, its logic will prevail with no obvious or 
logical benchmarks to provide limits. 
How can we close Pandora’s box?  I propose here a few ideas 
that will lead us in that direction: 
 Shift the underlying framework from addressing the 
“most dangerous” to preventing the “most violence.”  
The aim of public policy ought to be to have a mix of 
tools that are optimized to effect the largest, most 
effective reduction in sexual offending. 
 Base public policy and program design on the growing 
body of knowledge about sexual offending.  Decisions 
about resource allocation and program design ought to 
be grounded on empirical knowledge about the diversity, 
patterns, causes, prediction, and treatment of sexual 
offending. 
 Prevention programs must be systematically, not 
incrementally, built and evaluated.  Addressing the “most 
violence” requires having a range of interventions and 
the ability to allocate resources and risks among those 
interventions.  Expansion of expensive, intensive 
interventions is hard to resist unless the next most 
intensive tool is available and adequately funded. 
 The politics of sexual violence must be addressed.  The 
news media must be part of the solution, helping to 
reframe public discourse.  Basing systems on evidence 
and cost-benefit allocations provides public officials 
firmer ground than arbitrary, ad hoc design decisions.  
Innovations like problem-solving courts should be used 
to coordinate and rationalize individual plans for 
offender supervision and treatment in the community. 
 Governments should fund research, development, and 
evaluation.  Key areas where more knowledge is needed 
include: efficacy of treatment and supervision of sex 
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offenders in the community; identification of “dynamic” 
predictors of sexual recidivism; development and 
evaluation of broad-based primary (public-health style) 
interventions that attempt to change attitudes and 
behaviors before sexual abuse occurs; and whether legal 
tools such as mandatory reporting and community 
notification are, on balance, effective in reducing 
violence. 
 
